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Abstract
In very different fields of economics, economic inference and policy
evaluation require economists to parametrize a production function
that links measures of input factors to measures of output. While do-
ing so, strong assumptions are implicitly made about microeconomic
variables governing the shape of the aggregate production function. In
this paper, I develop an assignment model that provides a microeco-
nomic foundation for aggregate production functions. The shape of
the production function depends crucially on the distribution of work-
ers and jobs and the type of technological changes depends crucially
on the evolution of these distributions. Sufficient and necessary con-
ditions are provided for the production function to be of the Constant
Ratio of Elasticities of Substitution form, a form nesting the broadly
used Constant Elasticity of Substitution form. This model provides a
way to evaluate how stringent assumptions about the type of produc-
tion function or technological change are by comparing the implied
distribution of jobs and its evolution over time to observations of the
distribution of jobs and its evolution over time.
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1 Introduction
In very different fields of economics, economic inference and policy evaluation
require economists to parametrize a production function that links measures
of input factors to measures of output. While doing so, strong assumptions
are implicitly made about microeconomic variables such as the distribution
of factors (see Houthakker (1955-1956)), the distribution of ideas (see Jones
(2005)), the distribution of productivity (see Rosen (1978)) or the distrib-
ution of jobs (this paper). For instance, in the literature about skill-biased
technological change and rising skill-premium, a standard assumption is that
aggregate production is of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) type
and technical change is skilled-labor augmenting.1 What the CES assump-
tion implies for the distribution of jobs or what the skilled-labor augmenting
technical change implies for the evolution of the distribution of jobs over
time is not known. A general drawback of using production functions is that
these functions lack micro-economic foundations that would enable us to jus-
tify our parametrization. Without identifying the microeconomic forces that
govern the structure of production, economic inference and policy implica-
tions based on reduced form aggregate production functions may be highly
hazardous.
Surprisingly enough, very little is known about the microeconomic foun-
dations of production functions. To my knowledge, only Houthakker (1955-
1956), Levhari (1968), Rosen (1978) and more recently Jones (2005) and
Lagos (2007) have viewed production functions as reduced form of micro-
founded models. In Houthakker’s (1955-1956) original work,2 the aggregate
production function is derived from the distribution of inputs across produc-
tive cells (e.g. firms, machines or workers). Houthakker shows that when
the distribution of inputs is of the generalized Pareto type, the aggregate
production function then has the Cobb-Douglas form.3 A shortcoming of
this approach is that inputs are randomly distributed across productive cells
whereas inputs mix are more likely to be the result of a matching process
at the level of the productive cell. Rosen’s (1978) tasks assignment model
accounts for the non random assignment of inputs. In his model, the prob-
1See Katz and Murphy (1992) and Acemoglu (2002) and references therein.
2See also Johansen (1972), Sato (1975) and Hildenbrand (1981) among others.
3Levhari (1968) showed that this result could be extended to CES production function
when inputs are distributed according to a Beta distribution. Jones (2005) builds on this
model and derives the shape of the production function and the direction of technical
change from the distribution of ideas. Lagos (2007) also builds on Houthakker’s model
and derive the shape of the aggregate production function in a model with search frictions
in the labor market.
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lem is to assign workers of different productive types to heterogenous tasks
so as to maximize aggregate output. Rosen (1978) then derives the shape of
the aggregate production function from the assignment of workers to tasks.
When tasks are uniformly distributed and under additional assumptions on
the productivity of workers in the various tasks, the aggregate production
function is of the CES type with constant returns to scale.
In this paper, I consider a tasks assignment model with two types of work-
ers and heterogeneity of workers within types and, general distributional form
of tasks. In contrast to Rosen’s (1978) model that ignores capital, each task
is associated with a unit of capital, a machine for the sake of the argument,
and output is therefore produced using both capital and labor inputs. The
assignment problem is solved using Ricardo’s principles of comparative ad-
vantage and differential rents. In the economy considered, each machine can
only be operated by one worker at a time. As a result, the shape of the
aggregate production function is governed principally by the distribution of
tasks in contrast to Rosen’s (1978) model in which the shape of the pro-
duction function is driven by the productivity of the worker-task matches.
This makes the model of this paper very convenient to check the validity of
assumptions made when using macro production functions. While informa-
tion on the physical productivity of worker-task pairs is rarely available in
data sets, information about the distribution of jobs can readily be derived
in most data sets using occupational codes for instance.
Closed form solutions for the shape of the aggregate production function
can be recovered in this general assignment model. In particular, I will show
that the aggregate production function has the Constant Ratio of Elasticities
of Substitution (CRES) type when tasks are distributed according to the Beta
distribution and the productivity of a match worker-task is Cobb-Douglas
and function of the output level. With the additional restriction that the Beta
distribution is symmetric, the aggregate production function degenerates to
the CES type with general returns to scale.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section,
I present the model of tasks assignment with multidimensional skills. In
section 3, a parametrization of the model is proposed so that the aggregate
production function is of the CES type. An extension of the model to derive
the CRES production function type is proposed and necessary conditions for
the aggregate production function to be of the C(R)ES type are derived. This
parametrization enables us to reveal what microeconomic assumptions on
the distribution of tasks are made when imposing the aggregate production
function to be of the C(R)ES type. In section 4, using the results of the
model, I argue that the type of changes in the distribution of tasks implicitly
imposed in the skill-biased technical change literature (see Katz and Murphy
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(1992) or Acemoglu (2002)), by using a CES production function with skill-
labor augmenting technical change, does not fit well with recent empirical
evidence about job polarization (see Autor et al. (2006)) and the density
increase in the upper tail of the distribution of firm size (see Gabaix and
Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008)).
2 Tasks assignment model with two types of
heterogenous workers and a continuum of
tasks
2.1 Setting of the model
Consider an economy where workers are heterogenous in terms of their type
and level of skills. By analogy to product differentiation, the types of skills
correspond to horizontal differentiation between workers and the level of
skills corresponds to vertical differentiation between workers within types.
For simplicity, let there be two types of skills, say type 1 and 2. To fix ideas,
think of type 1 skills as manual skills and type 2 skills as intellectual skills.
The mass of type k workers is Sk and without loss of generality, the total mass
of workers is assumed to be unity, i.e. S1+S2 = 1. Within types, workers are
heterogenous with respect to their skills level. Let tk ∈ [tk,∞), indicate the
level of skills of a type k worker. The distribution of workers within types is
then characterized by the probability density function sk(tk) for k = 1, 2 and
the cumulative density function Sk(tk), with limtk→∞ Sk(tk) ≡ Sk.
This economy produces a composite commodity by means of the input
of an infinite number of different tasks. Each task is associated with a unit
of capital, a machine for the sake of the argument, and the various tasks
correspond to machines with different characteristics.4 To produce output,
each machine needs to be operated by a fixed proportion of workers, i.e. one
and only one worker. Aggregate output Y is obtained by summing up the
production in each single task.5
4This part of the model is to a large extent similar to the differential rents models
described in Sattinger (1979 and 1993). The terminology “task” and “machine” are inter-
changeable throughout the paper. In general I will use “task” for the sake of simplicity
but when needed I will refer explicitly to machines.
5This contrasts with Rosen’s (1978) model that ignores capital. In Rosen’s model, tasks
from different jobs are needed in fixed proportions to produce aggregate output, there is
no substitution possibilities between tasks, but each job can be filled with more than one
worker. This also contrasts with assignment models proposed by Lucas (1978), Rosen
(1981, 1982), Becker (1981), Kremer (1993), Kremer and Maskin (1996), Garicano (2000),
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Output at each task can be produced by workers with different types
and levels of skills but workers of different types and levels of skills differ in
their productivity. For instance, while an intellectual worker could operate
a circular saw with some productivity, a manual worker would probably be
more productive. Similarly, while a manual worker could use a computer
productively, an intellectual worker would probably make better use of the
same computer. These examples suggest that, under certain assumptions,
machines could be ranked on a one dimensional support. The position of
machines on this support would indicate a gradual change from extremely
manual machines to extremely intellectual machines as we move from the left
to the right.
The required assumptions for the support of tasks to be unidimensional
are better understood with the following experiment in mind. Suppose we
assign a randomly chosen manual worker successively to each task of this
economy and rank these tasks by decreasing productivity. Similarly, we as-
sign a randomly chosen intellectual worker successively to each task and
rank the tasks by increasing productivity. The first fundamental assumption
about the support of tasks is that the ranking of tasks would be exactly
the same in both cases, meaning that the most manual tasks are also the
least intellectual ones and vice versa as caricatured in Figure 1. Note that
this assumption is a sufficient condition for comparative advantage of types
of workers to arise. Manual workers have a comparative advantage in low
ranked, manual, tasks and intellectual workers have a comparative advantage
in high ranked, intellectual, tasks.
The second fundamental assumption about the support of tasks is that
the ranking of tasks is the same for all workers, or stated otherwise, does not
depend on the level of skills. A sufficient condition for the rank of tasks to be
the same for all workers is the complementarity between machines and skills.
The complementarity assumption stipulates that the change in productivity
associated with an increase in the level of manual (intellectual) skills is larger
in more manual (respectively intellectual) tasks. Hence, increasing the level
of manual (intellectual) skills in Figure 1 would level up the bars in job titles
with low (respectively high) rank compared to job titles with high (low) rank
but would not affect the rank of job titles.
Given these two assumptions we can define the support of tasks as follows.
Let v denote a task and, without loss of generality, let the support of task
be the unit interval (0, 1), with tasks v increasing from 0 to 1 as the rank of
tasks defined above increases. To fix ideas, tasks close to 0 are for instance
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006) and Fox (2006) where the output of several
tasks are complementary.
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the tasks of a carpenter and tasks close to 1 are the tasks of a rocket scientist.
Similarly, machines close to 0 could be circular saws and machines close to
1 could be computers. Tasks in the middle of the support are the “anybody
can do it as efficiently” tasks.
Once the support of tasks is defined, the productivity of a worker with
tk units of skills of type k when assigned at task v can be defined by the
function pk(tk, v). By definition of the support of tasks, the comparative
advantage assumptions implies ∂p1(t1,v)∂v < 0 and
∂p2(t2,v)
∂v > 0 ∀v, tk and the
complementarity assumption implies ∂
2p1(t1,v)
∂t1∂v ≤ 0 and
∂2p2(t2,v)
∂t2∂v ≥ 0 ∀v, tk.
To these two assumptions, it seems reasonable to add an absolute advantage
assumption indicating that more skilled workers are more productive at all
tasks. As it will be shown below, this assumption guarantees that equilibrium
wages increase with the level of skills. The absolute advantage assumption
implies ∂pk(tk,v)∂tk > 0 ∀v, tk. These assumptions are summarized in Assumption
A.
Assumption A: i) Comparative advantage of skills types, i.e. ∂p1(t1,v)∂v < 0 and
∂p2(t2,v)
∂v > 0 ∀v, tk, ii) complementarity of skills and machines
∂2p1(t1,v)
∂t1∂v ≤ 0
and ∂
2p2(t2,v)
∂t2∂v ≥ 0 ∀v, tk, iii) absolute advantage of skilled workers,
∂pk(tk,v)
∂tk > 0
∀v, tk,
The distribution of tasks is characterized by the probability density func-
tion f(v) and cumulative density function F (v) and assumed exogenous. For
the sake of simplicity, it is further assumed that the mass of tasks equals the
mass of workers. Finally, this economy is perfectly competitive so that no
worker and no owner of capital can affect the wage and rental rates.
2.2 Tasks assignment and equilibrium
Following Sattinger (1979 and 1993), the general equilibrium of this model is
derived in three steps once we assume that the distribution of tasks does not
depend on wages. In the first step, we make a tentative assumption about
the assignment of workers to tasks in equilibrium. The second step consists
to derive the associated equilibrium wages for this assignment. Finally, in
the third step, we check whether the second order conditions for equilibrium
are satisfied by the equilibrium wages derived in step 2.
Step 1: Tentative tasks assignment
Given assumption A i), an efficient assignment of workers to tasks will
maximize output by assigning workers with skills of type 1 to tasks close to
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0 and workers with skills of type 2 to tasks close to 1. Given assumption A
ii) and iii), task 0 will be assigned to those with the highest level of type 1
skills, from the remaining task, the nearest to zero will be assigned to those
workers with the second highest level of type 1 skills and so on until either
all workers with type 1 skills have been assigned to a task or no more type 1
workers are willing to supply their skills at the outgoing wage. Let the level
of skills of the last type 1 worker willing to supply her skills be t1,ε1 ≥ t1
and the task to which this worker is assigned be ε1 = F−1(S1−S1(t1,ε1)),6 so
that t1,ε1 = t1 and ε1 = F−1(S1) when all type 1 workers find it profitable to
supply their skills. By symmetry, among workers with skills of type 2, those
with the highest level of type 2 skills will be assigned to task 1 and so on
until either all type 2 workers have been assigned to a task or no more type
2 workers are willing to supply their skills at the outgoing wage. Let this
worker have skills t2,ε2 ≥ t2 and the task to which this worker is assigned be
given by ε2 = 1−F−1(S2−S2(t2,ε2)), so that t2,ε2 = t2 and ε2 = 1−F−1(S2)
when all type 2 workers find it profitable to supply their skills. Hence, when
equilibrium wages are so that all workers are willing to supply their skills,
we have ε1 = ε2 = ε.7 The marginal task ε is simply derived by taking the
inverse of the cumulative density function of tasks evaluated at S1, that is
ε = F−1(S1).
This efficient tasks assignment results in a mapping function v1 that asso-
ciates to each value of skills t1 a single value of task v ∈ (0, ε1), i.e. v1 = v1(t1)
with v01 < 0, and a mapping function v2 that associates to each value of skills
t2 a single value of task v ∈ (ε2, 1), i.e. v2 = v2(t2) and v02 > 0.8 The
6Assuming that all workers with skills higher than t1,ε1 are willing to work given that
worker with skills t1,ε1 is willing to work, requires two assumptions. First, equilibrium
wages increase with skills. I will show below that equilibrium wages do increase with skills
as long as the absolute advantage assumption A iii) holds, that is, as long as produc-
tivity increases with skills. Second, either all workers have the same reservation wage or
reservation wages increase with skills but at a lower rate than equilibrium wages.
7Note two things. First, firms are indifferent between assigning a worker with type 1
or type 2 at task ε. Second, I herewith implicitly assume that firms owning the marginal
machines are at least indifferent between supplying the machine to the market or with-
holding the machine from the market and, workers with the lowest skills of each type are
at least indifferent between being assigned to machine ε or remaining unemployed. Hence,
I assume that the equlibrium pricing functions, wages and rents, are so that both workers
and machines are rewarded at least their reservation prices. This assumption is discussed
below.
8See Sattinger (1975). Functions vi, i = 1, 2 play the same role as the function h(g) in
Sattinger (1975) p. 356, where g is workers’ ability (single scale) and h(g) the difficulty
(single scale) of the task performed by workers with ability g in equilibrium and, c(u) in
Teulings (1995a), (1995b) and (2005) where u is the normalized level of skills and c(u) the
associated job complexity in equilibrium.
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functions v1 and v2 are monotonic, decreasing and increasing respectively
on t1 ∈ [t1,ε1 ,∞) and t2 ∈ [t2,ε2 ,∞) since within types of skills more skilled
workers are assigned to more productive machines in equilibrium.
To show how the assignment equilibrates the supply of and demand for
skills, I split the interval of tasks assigned to type 1 workers, v ∈ (0, ε1)
into N intervals of equal length ∆i = ∆ = ε1N for i = 1, ..., N . Labor
demand in interval i, that is the number of tasks to be filled in interval
i, is
R i∆
(i−1)∆ f(v)dv. To equilibrate each tasks interval firms will assign theR ∆
0
f(v)dv most skilled workers to the first interval, the following
R 2∆
∆ f(v)dv
most skilled workers to the second interval and so on and so forth until the last
interval is filled with the
R N∆
(N−1)∆ f(v)dv least skilled workers. Note however
that, since the density distribution of workers by level of skills needs not
correspond to the density distribution of tasks, the skill differences between
the most and least skilled workers in each interval needs not be the same. For
instance, suppose that skills are normally distributed among workers of type
1 and tasks are uniformly distributed on (0, 1). The skill differential will first
decrease (upper tail of a normal distribution is thinner than the upper tail of
a uniform distribution) and increase once the median skilled worker has been
assigned. The assignment of tasks to workers deforms (stretches) the density
distribution of skills of each type such as to make it fit the distribution of
tasks in equilibrium.
The assignment of workers can therefore directly be derived from the
density of tasks by performing the transformation of variables v = vk(tk) and
noting that dv = v0k(tk)dtk. This yields:
Z v1(∞)
v1(t1,ε1 )
f(v1(t1))v01(t1)dt1 =
Z ∞
t1,ε1
s1(t1)dt1 ≡ S1(t1,ε1) for v1(t1,ε1) ≤ ε1(1)Z v2(∞)
v2(t2,ε2 )
f(v2(t2))v02(t2)dt2 =
Z ∞
t2,ε2
s2(t2)dt2 ≡ S2(t2,ε2) for v2(t2,ε2) ≥ ε2(2)
The mapping functions therefore equilibrate supply and demand every-
where on tk, k = 1, 2, so that we have sk(tk) = f(vk(tk))v0k(tk) for all
tk ≥ tk,εk , k = 1, 2. These are first order nonlinear nonautonomous dif-
ferential equations.9
Step 2: Equilibrium wages
9Examples of closed form solutions are available in the one skill dimension case in
Sattinger (1975), (1979) and (1993). Teulings (1995a), (1995b) and (2005) solves a second
order differential equation in the one skill scale case.
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The owner of machine v seeks to maximize the profits derived from its
machine. The profits from assigning a worker with skills tk are r(v) =
pk(tk, v) − wk(tk). The owner will therefore compare the productivity in-
crease to the wage increase associated to a worker with higher skills tk for all
k. This yields the following first order condition:
∂pk(tk, v)
∂tk
= w0k(tk) ∀k = 1, 2 (3)
Note that from assumptions A iii), we therefore have that equilibrium
wages are increasing with the level of skills, w0k(tk) > 0 ∀k = 1, 2.
The equilibrium rents are obtained in a similar fashion by noting that
earnings are given by wk(tk) = pk(tk, v)− r(v). Earnings maximization leads
workers with skills tk to compare the productivity increase to the rent increase
associated to a machine ranked to the left or the right of v. Hence, the first
order conditions to earnings maximization are given by:
∂pk(tk, v)
∂v = r
0(v) ∀k = 1, 2 (4)
Moreover, in the case where all workers supply their skills, the owners of
machine ε are indifferent between employing the worker supplying the lowest
level of skills of type 1, t1, or the worker supplying the lowest level of skills
of type 2, t2. Stated otherwise, the rents of the owners of machines ε are
equal whether worker t1 or t2 are assigned to machine ε: p1(t1, ε)−w1(t1) =
p2(t2, ε)− w2(t2).
Step 3: Second order conditions
The equilibrium assignment defined by the mapping functions vk, is a
valid one only when the firm’s second order condition to profits maximization,
that is profits are concave in tk, is satisfied. Put in equation:
∙
∂2pk(tk, v)
∂t2k
¸
v=vk(tk)
− w”k(tk) < 0 ∀k = 1, 2
⇔
−
∙
∂2pk(tk, v)
∂tk∂v
v0k
¸
v=vk(tk)
< 0
since w00k(tk) =
h
∂2pk(tk,v)
∂t2k
i
v=vk(tk)
+
h
∂2pk(tk,v)
∂tk∂v v
0
k(tk)
i
v=vk(tk)
.
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The second order conditions for earnings maximization read as:
∙
∂2pk(tk, v)
∂v2
¸
tk=v−1k (v)
− r”(v) < 0 ∀k = 1, 2
⇔
−
∙
∂2pk(tk, v)
∂tk∂v
1
v0k
¸
tk=v−1k (v)
< 0
since r00(v) =
h
∂2pk(tk,v)
∂v2k
i
tk=v−1k (v)
+
h
∂2pk(tk,v)
∂tk∂v
1
v0k
i
tk=v−1k (v)
.
Since v01 < 0 and v02 > 0 these second order conditions therefore imply thath
∂2p1(t1,v)
∂t1∂v
i
v=v1(t1)
< 0 and
h
∂2p2(t2,v)
∂t2∂v
i
v=v2(t2)
> 0. Hence, as long as the cross
derivative ∂
2p1(t1,v)
∂t1∂v is negative and the cross derivative
∂2p2(t2,v)
∂t2∂v is positive,
that is as long as assumption A ii) holds, an assignment where within types
of skills more skilled workers get more productive machines, i.e. v01 < 0 and
v02 > 0, is valid.
Equilibrium pricing functions
Evaluating the differential equation 3 at v = vk(tk) and integrating over
tk yields the wage function for workers with skills of type k.
wk(t∗k) = wk0 +
t∗kZ
tk
∙
∂pk(tk, v)
∂tk
¸
v=vk(tk)
dtk (5)
where wk0 is a constant of integration.
Similarly, evaluating the differential equation 4 at tk = v−1k (v) and inte-
grating over v yields the rent function as follows:
r(v∗) = r0 +
v∗Z
εk
∙
∂pk(tk, v)
∂v
¸
tk=v−1k (v)
dv (6)
where r0 is a constant of integration.
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The wage and rent functions are identified up to constants of integration.
Following Sattinger (1979),10 the model is closed by specifying exogenous re-
serve prices for the marginal workers and machine. For the least skilled work-
ers in both groups to be indifferent between being assigned to machine ε or
remaining unemployed we need wk(tk) = wk0 = ew > 0 where ew is the reser-
vation wage. Since firms owing machines ε are indifferent between employing
the least skilled worker of each type, we have r(ε) = r0 = pk(v−1k (ε), ε)− ew ≥ 0
for k = 1, 2 and ∀ε. Hence, for the firms owing machines ε to be indifferent
between supplying the machine to the market or withholding the machine
from the market we need r0 = pk(v−1k (ε), ε)− ew = er for all k where er is the
reserve price for the owner of capital. So, as long as r0 = er and wk0 = ew,
there will be full employment in the economy.
2.3 The shape of the aggregate production function
Using the mapping functions vk, the aggregate output level is given by:11
Y (ε) =
Z ε
0
p1(v−11 (v), v)f(v)dv +
Z 1
ε
p2(v−12 (v), v)f(v)dv (7)
To retrieve the shape of the aggregate production function associated to
this economy, we can derive the demand for type k workers by integrating
the number of workers per unit of output for each skills type (the inverse of
the worker’s productivity) over the spectrum of tasks. This is given by:
D1 (ε)
Y (ε) =
Z ε
0
f(v)
p1(v−11 (v), v)
dv (8)
D2 (ε)
Y (ε) =
Z 1
ε
f(v)
p2(v−12 (v), v)
dv (9)
Solving equation 8 for the marginal task ε and plugging this result into
equation 9, one can derive, under invertible conditions, the shape of the pro-
duction function as Y (ε) = h(D1(ε), D2(ε)). In the general case, analytical
solutions for h(., .) will not be possible. However, as I will show in the next
10Costrell and Loury (2004) consider a continuum of tasks in a single enterprise, not in
the whole economy, and therefore close the model by a free entry condition that drives
profits of each enterprise down to 0.
11Note that using the mapping functions to perform the change of variables vk = vk(tk),
one can also express total output as a function of the distribution of skills replacing v by
vk(tk) and f(v)dv by s(tk)dtk.
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section, under certain restrictions, h could take the general form of a CRES
production function which admits the CES production function as a special
case.
3 Parametric specification
3.1 Tasks distribution
Suppose tasks follow a Beta distribution. The probability density function
of tasks is then given by:
f(v|d1, d2) = 1B(d1 + 1, d2 + 1)v
d1(1− v)d2
with dj > −1 and B(.) is the Beta function and cumulative distribution
F (v∗|d1, d2) =
R v∗
0
f(v|d1, d2)dv.
The mean task is given by E[v] = d1+1
2+d1+d2 (E[v] =
1
2
when d1 = d2) and
the variance by V ar[v] = (d1+1)(d2+1)
(2+d1+d2)(3+d1+d2) , with
∂V ar[v]
∂dk < 0. Moreover, the
distribution is skewed toward 0 when d1 > d2 and vice versa.
The Beta distribution is appealing because its support ranges from 0 to
1, it has only two parameters, and its shape is extremely flexible. If dj < 0
for all j, the distribution is U-shaped. If d1 < 0 and d2 > 0, the distribution
has a inverted J-shape and if d1 > 0 and d2 < 0, the distribution has a
J-shape. If d1 > 0 and d2 > 0 the distribution is unimodal. If d1 = d2 = d
and d = 0 tasks are uniformly distributed. Moreover, for d > 1 the Beta
distribution and the normal distribution with average 1
2
and variance equal
to (d1+1)(d2+1)
(2+d1+d2)(3+d1+d2) look alike.
3.2 Productivity of a match worker-machine
Suppose further that the productivity of workers with skills k assigned to
machine v is Cobb-Douglas as follows:
p1(t1, v) = b1tm11 (1− v)n1 (10)
p2(t2, v) = b2tm22 vn2 (11)
The parameters bk are strictly positive and indicate the efficiency units of
workers with skills k. The parameters mk indicates the elasticity of output
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with respect to skills, withmk > 0 to satisfy assumptionA iii), i.e. ∂pk/∂tk >
0. nk indicates the elasticity of output with respect to tasks, with nk > 0 to
satisfy assumptions A i) and ii).
3.3 Mapping functions
As shown above, the resolution of the assignment problem requires to solve
first order nonlinear nonautonomous differential equations. Closed form solu-
tions are unlikely to exist. One way to circumvent this problem is to impose
the shape of the mapping functions vk(tk) and solve the equations for the
density functions sk(tk). Then, using individual data containing information
on skills, one could calibrate the parameters of the mapping functions so as to
fit as close as possible (non)parametric estimations of the density functions.
This solution is particularly adequate in our context since the aim of this
paper is to infer on the shape of the mapping function that combined with
the above assumptions on the tasks density function and on the productivity
of worker-machine pairs yields a CES production function at the aggregate
output level.
Suppose that the function assigning skills of type 1 to tasks in equilibrium
is such that v = v1(t1) = ε
³
t1
t1
´1/a1
with a1 ≥ 0 to satisfy v01 < 0 and
the function assigning skills of type 2 to tasks is such that v = v2(t2) =
1 − (1− ε)
³
t2
t2
´1/a2
with a2 ≥ 0 to satisfy v02 > 0. These specifications for
the mapping functions imply full employment. Workers with the highest level
of type 1 and type 2 skills, tj →∞, are assigned to task 0 and 1 respectively
and workers with the lowest levels of both types of skills, tj = tj, are assigned
to the marginal task ε.12
Using the expression of the mapping functions and the density of tasks,
the density of workers with t1 skills of type 1 is given by:
s1(t1) =
At1
a1
εd1+1
Ã
1− ε
µ
t1
t1
¶1/a1!d2 µt1
t1
¶d1/a1+1/a1−1
(12)
for 0 < t1 < t1.
The density of workers with t2 skills of type 2 is given by:
12Unemployment of type j workers could be derived by replacing tj in vj(.) by t∗j with
tj,εj > tj .
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s2(t2) =
At2
a2
(1− ε)d2+1
Ã
1− (1− ε)
µ
t2
t2
¶1/a2!d1 µt2
t2
¶d2/a2+1/a2−1
(13)
for 0 < t2 < t2.
The aggregate output level, obtained by summing up the product of each
worker or equivalently the product at each task in equilibrium reads as:
Y (ε) =
Z ε
0
p1(v−11 (v), v)f(v)dv +
Z 1
ε
p2(v−12 (v), v)f(v)dv
= b1tm11 εa1m1A
Z ε
0
vd1−a1m1(1− v)d2+n1dv +
b2tm22 (1− ε)a2m2A
Z 1
ε
vd1+n2(1− v)d2−a2m2dv
After recognizing that A1vd1−a1m1(1 − v)d2+n1 is the density of the Beta
distribution with parameter d1−a1m1 and d2+n1 with A1 = 1B(d1−a1m1,d2+n1)
and A2vd1+n2(1 − v)d2−a2m2 is the density of the Beta distribution with pa-
rameters d1 + n2 and d2 − a2m2 with A2 = 1B(d1+n2,d2−a2m2) , the aggregate
output level reads as:
Y (ε) = b1tm11 εa1m1
A
A1
F (ε|d1 − a1m1, d2 + n1) +
b2tm22 (1− ε)a2m2
A
A2
(1− F (ε|d1 + n2, d2 − a2m2))
3.4 The shape of the aggregate production function
Given the structural form in equation 10 and 11, the employment of type k
workers per unit of output in equilibrium reads as:
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D1 (ε)
Y (ε) =
Z ε
0
f(v|d1, d2)
p1(v−11 (v), v)
dv (14)
=
A
εa1m1
1
b1tm11
Z ε
0
vd1+a1m1(1− v)d2−n1dv
D2 (ε)
Y (ε) =
Z 1
ε
f(v|d1, d2)
p2(v−12 (v); v)
dv (15)
=
A
(1− ε)a2m2
1
b2tm22
Z 1
ε
vd1−n2(1− v)d2+a2m2dv
Analytical solutions for these integrals exist. An interesting special case
of which is met when dj = nk, j 6= k.13 The solutions of these integrals are
then:
D1 (ε)
Y (ε) =
A
b1tm11
1
d1 + a1m1 + 1
εd1+1 (16)
D2 (ε)
Y (ε) =
A
b2tm22
1
d2 + a2m2 + 1
(1− ε)d2+1 (17)
Note that, for a symmetric distribution of tasks, i.e. d1 = d2 = 1θ − 1,
solving the system for the marginal task ε yields:
ε =
µ
D1 (ε)
Y
b1tm11 (d1 + a1m1 + 1)
A
¶θ
(18)
= 1−
µ
D2 (ε)
Y
b2tm22 (d2 + a2m2 + 1)
A
¶θ
(19)
Moreover, equating the left hand side of both equation 18 and equation
19 and solving for Y yields:
13The restriction dj = nk > 0 implies that the distribution of tasks must be unimodal.
excluding U−shaped distributions met for−1 < dj < 0 for all j, or J−shaped distributions
met when −1 < dj < 0 and dk > 0. I will show in the next section that changing slightly
the shape of the production function, within the Cobb-Douglas family, CES production
functions can still be recorved for U−shaped, J−shaped or uniform distribution of tasks.
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Y (ε) = 1A
h
(χ1D1 (ε))
θ
+ (χ2D2 (ε))
θ
i 1
θ
(20)
where χj = bjt
mj
j (dj + ajmj + 1)
Equation 20 reads as a CES production function with elasticity of substi-
tution parameter σ = 1
1−θ . Since the parameter θ is related to the distribution
of tasks, the elasticity of substitution parameter σ is directly linked to the
distribution of tasks.
Result R1: When i) the productivity of a match worker-task is Cobb-Douglas,
i.e. as defined as in equations 10 and 11, ii) the mapping functions are
given by v = v1(t1) = ε
³
t1
t1
´1/a1
and v = v2(t2) = 1 − (1− ε)
³
t2
t2
´1/a2
,
iii) dj = nk, j 6= k and iv) the distribution of tasks follows a symmetric
Beta distribution, then the aggregate production function resulting from the
assignment of multi-skilled heterogenous workers to heterogenous tasks has
the CES shape.
3.5 Extension
Result R1 is very convenient as it links the assignment literature to the em-
pirical literature of wage inequality in which the CES production function
has been extensively used. However, it is restrictive in the sense that only
symmetric distributions of machines are covered, though these distributions
can range from the uniform distribution when θ = 1 (σ →∞ linear produc-
tion function), inverted-U shape for 2 > 1θ > 1 (σ ∈ (2,∞)) and normal look
alike distributions for 1θ > 2, (σ ∈ (1, 2)).
Nevertheless, one can generalize this finding and solve for more general
shapes of the production function assuming that the productivity of workers
in the various tasks depends on how many units of aggregate output are
produced. Assume for instance that producing an extra unit of output affects
the productivity of all workers in every tasks. Let bk ≡ bk(Y ) = rkY 1−
θ
θk
with rk > 0, θ > 0 and θk = 1dk+1 , so that employing more workers in each
task reduces (increases) the productivity per unit of output of each worker in
every tasks, i.e. ∂pk∂Y < 0 for 1−
θ
θk < 0 (respectively
∂pk
∂Y > 0 for 1−
θ
θk > 0).
Under this assumption, the demand for type k workers reads as:
16
D1 (ε)
Y (ε) =
A
r1Y (ε)1−
θ
θ1 tm11
1
d1 + a1m1 + 1
εd1+1 (21)
D2 (ε)
Y (ε) =
A
r2Y (ε)1−
θ
θ2 tm22
1
d2 + a2m2 + 1
(1− ε)d2+1 (22)
Which solving for the marginal task yields:
ε = 1Y (ε)θ
µ
r1tm11 (d1 + a1m1 + 1)
A D1 (ε)
¶θ1
(23)
= 1− 1Y (ε)θ
µ
r2tm22 (d2 + a2m2 + 1)
A D2 (ε)
¶θ2
(24)
⇔
Y (ε) =
h
(ψ1D1 (ε))
θ1 + (ψ2D2 (ε))
θ2
i 1θ
(25)
where ψj =
rjt
mj
j (dj+ajmj+1)
A .
Equation 25 reads as the CRES production function (see Houthakker
(1960) and Dick and Medoff (1975)). This function degenerates to a CES
production function with returns to scale θ1θ when θ1 = θ2 that is for sym-
metric tasks distributions. When θ1 = θ2 = θ, the function degenerates to
the constant returns to scale CES production function discussed above.
Result R2: When i) the productivity of a match worker-task is Cobb-Douglas
and is function of the output level, i.e. as defined as in equations 10 and 11, ii)
the mapping functions are given by v = v1(t1) = ε
³
t1
t1
´1/a1
and v = v2(t2) =
1 − (1− ε)
³
t2
t2
´1/a2
, iii) dj = nk, j 6= k, and iv) the distribution of tasks
follows a Beta distribution, then the aggregate production function resulting
from the assignment of multi-skilled heterogenous workers to heterogenous
tasks is of the CRES shape.
3.6 Necessary conditions
The previous section has shown sufficient conditions for the distribution of
tasks, the shape of the productivity of worker-task pairs and the mapping
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functions to derive a CRES production function. In this section, I derive the
necessary conditions to yield a CRES production function. From equations
23 and 24 it is easy to see that in order to derive a CRES production function,
we need the following relationship between the marginal task and the demand
for workers of each type:
ε =
µ
D1
Y Λ
−1
1
¶θ1
1− ε =
µ
D2
Y Λ
−1
2
¶θ2
where Λj are parameters.
Rearranging and using the definition of the demand for workers per unit
of outputs, we have the following expression for the demand for workers of
each type per unit of output:
D1
Y ≡
Z ε
0
f(v)
p1(t1(v), v)
dv = Λ1
£
vβ1εγ1
¤ε
0
= Λ1ε1/θ1 (26)
D2
Y ≡
Z 1
ε
f(v)
p2(t2(v), v)
dv = Λ2
£
(1− v)β2(1− ε)γ2
¤1
ε = Λ2(1− ε)
1/θ2(27)
where βj + γj = 1θj and tj(v) ≡ v
−1
j (v).
Note that at this point, it is convenient to write the inverse mapping
functions14 tj(v) ≡ v−1j (v) as functions of two arguments, v and ε, i.e. tj(v, ε).
Equations 26 and 27 imply that:
f(v)
p1(t1(v, ε), v)
=
Λ1
β1
vβ1−1εγ1 (28)
f(v)
p2(t2(v, ε), v)
=
Λ2
β2
(1− v)β2−1(1− ε)γ2 (29)
Since the right hand sides of equations 28 and 29 are multiplicatively
separable in v and ε and (1−v) and (1−ε) respectively, the left hand sides of
these equations must also be multiplicatively separable in v and ε and, (1−v)
14The mapping functions are strictly monotonic on v so that their inverse are well-defined
and also strictly monotonic.
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and (1−ε) respectively. For this to be true, i) the functions pj(tj(v, ε), v)must
be multiplicatively separable in tj and ε so that pj(tj(v, ε), v) = pj(tj(v, ε)) ·
gj(v), ii) the function tj(v, ε) must be multiplicatively separable in v and ε so
that tj(v, ε) = tj(v)·hj(ε) and iii) the functions pj(.) must be multiplicatively
separable so that pj(tj(v) ·hj(ε)) = pj(tj(v)) · pj(hj(ε)). When i), ii) and iii)
are satisfied, we have:
f(v)
p1(t1(v)) · p1(h1(ε)) · g1(v) =
Λ1
β1
vβ1−1εγ1 (30)
f(v)
p2(t2(v)) · p2(h2(ε)) · g2(v) =
Λ2
β2
(1− v)β2−1(1− ε)γ2 (31)
It is easy to see that p1(h1(ε)) must be of the form c1ε−γ1 and p1(h1(ε)) of
the form c2(1− ε)−γ2 .
Hence, necessary conditions to obtain a CRES aggregate production are:
1. The productivity of worker-task is multiplicatively separable in worker
and task characteristics, i.e. pj(tj , v) = pj(tj) · gj(v),
2. the mapping functions are multiplicatively separable in task character-
istics and the marginal task, tj(v, ε) = tj(v) · hj(ε) and,
3. the contribution of worker’s characteristics to the output of worker-task
pairs is itself multiplicatively separable, i.e. pj(tj · hj) = pj(tj) · pj(hj)
Necessary conditions 1 and 3 are about the production function while
necessary condition 2 is about the mapping functions.
We can even go further and show that if the pj is Cobb-Douglas, the most
popular multiplicative separable production function in the literature, then
the mapping functions must be power functions and the distribution of tasks
must follow a beta distribution, which is the example given above.
In what follows I assume that the product of a worker-task pair is Cobb-
Douglas. In fact I distinguish between the following four specifications that
satisfy assumption A.
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A :
½
p1(t1, v) = b1tm11 vn1 and b1,m1 > 0 and n1 < 0
p2(t2, v) = b2tm22 vn2 and b2,m2, n2 > 0
B :
½
p1(t1, v) = b1tm11 (1− v)n1 and b1,m1, n1 > 0
p2(t2, v) = b2tm22 vn2 and b2,m2, n2 > 0
C :
½
p1(t1, v) = b1tm11 vn1 and b1,m1 > 0 and n1 < 0
p2(t2, v) = b2tm22 (1− v)n2 and b2,m2 > 0 and n2 < 0
D :
½
p1(t1, v) = b1tm11 (1− v)n1 and b1,m1 > 0 and n1 < 0
p2(t2, v) = b2tm22 (1− v)n2 and b2,m2 > 0 and n2 < 0
For all four specifications, the assumption on the production function
implies that pj(tj(v, ε)) = bj (tj(v, ε))mj and hence, using necessary condition
ii), that pj(hj(ε)) = bjhmjj (ε) and pj(tj(v)) = bjt
mj
j (v). From the necessary
conditions we also know that p1(h1(ε)) is of the form c1ε−γ1 and p2(h2(ε)) is
of the form c2(1− ε)−γ2 . Hence, the shape of the functions hj(ε) must be:
h1(ε) =
µ
c1
b1
¶1/m1
ε−γ1/m1 (32)
h2(ε) =
µ
c2
b2
¶1/m2
(1− ε)−γ2/m2 (33)
Moreover, by definition of the mapping functions and using necessary
condition ii), we have tj(ε, ε) = tj(ε)hj(ε) = tj. Replacing hj by its expres-
sion from equations 32 and 33, this yields the shape of the tj(v) functions
as:
t1(v) = t1
µ
b1
c1
¶1/m1
vγ1/m1 (34)
t2(v) = t2
µ
b2
c2
¶1/m2
(1− v)γ2/m2 (35)
Note that for the mapping function for type 1 skills to be decreasing and
the mapping function for type 2 skills to be increasing we need γj < 0 for
j = 1, 2. Plugging equations 34 and 35 in pj(tj(v)) = bjtmjj (v) we obtain the
following expression for pj(tj(v)):
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p1(t1(v)) = b1tm11
b1
c1
vγ1 (36)
p2(t2(v)) = b2tm22
b2
c2
(1− v)γ2 (37)
Plugging the expression of pj(tj(v)) and pj(hj(ε)) into equations 30 and
31 and rearranging yields:
f(v)
g1(v)
= b21tm11
Λ1
β1
vβ1−1+γ1 (38)
f(v)
g2(v)
= b22tm22
Λ2
β2
(1− v)β2−1+γ2 (39)
Although the results so far are generic to all four specifications of the pro-
duction function, the shapes of the functions gj(v) differ for each of the four
specifications of the production functions presented above. Hence, the den-
sity function f(v) depends on the choice of the specification of the production
function.
Case A :
The function gj(v) = vnj which yields:
f(v) = b21tm11
Λ1
β1
vβ1−1+γ1−n1 (40)
f(v) = b22tm22
Λ2
β2
(1− v)β2−1+γ2vn2 (41)
Noting that βj + γj = 1θj , for both equations to be true for all v, we
need n2 = 1θ1 − 1 − n1, θ2 = 1 and b
2
1tm11 Λ1β1 = b
2
2tm22 Λ2β2 =
1
B(n2+1,1) . The
density function is then f(v) = 1B(n2+1,1)v
n2 which is a special case of the
Beta distribution, namely the strictly increasing density family.
Case B :(example of the sufficient conditions derive in the previous section)
The functions g1(v) = (1− v)n1 and g2(v) = vn2 which yields:
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f(v) = b21tm11
Λ1
β1
vβ1−1+γ1(1− v)n1 (42)
f(v) = b22tm22
Λ2
β2
(1− v)β2−1+γ2vn2 (43)
For both equations to be true for all v, we need θj = 11+nk j 6= k and
b21tm11 Λ1β1 = b
2
2tm22 Λ2β2 =
1
B(n1+1,n1+1) . The density function is then f(v) =
1
B(n1+1,n1+1)v
n1(1 − v)n1 with nj > 0 which is a special case of the Beta
distribution, namely the unimodal family.
Case C :
The functions g1(v) = vn1 and g2(v) = (1− v)n2 which yields:
f(v) = b21tm11
Λ1
β1
vβ1−1+γ1+n1 (44)
f(v) = b22tm22
Λ2
β2
(1− v)β2−1+γ2+n2 (45)
For both equations to be true for all v, we need θj = 11−nj , 0 < nj < 1
and b21tm11 Λ1β1 = b
2
2tm22 Λ2β2 = 1. The density function is then f(v) = 1 which is
a special case of the Beta distribution, namely the uniform distribution.
Case D :
The functions gj(v) = (1− v)nj which yields:
f(v) = b21tm11
Λ1
β1
vβ1−1+γ1(1− v)n1 (46)
f(v) = b22tm22
Λ2
β2
(1− v)β2−1+γ2+n2 (47)
For both equations to be true for all v, we need n1 = 1θ2 − 1 + n2 and
θ1 = 1 and b21tm11 Λ1β1 = b
2
2tm22 Λ2β2 =
1
B(1,n1+1) . The density function is then
f(v) = 1B(1,n1+1)(1 − v)
n1 which is a special case of the Beta distribution,
namely the strictly decreasing density family.
The results obtained for the four separate cases are summarized in Table
1.
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4 Implications
The assignment model proposed in this paper provides microfoundations to
production functions. By deriving the shape of the aggregate production
function from the assignment of heterogenous workers to heterogenous tasks,
the model provides a way to evaluate how stringent assumptions about the
type of production functions or technological change are by comparing the
implied distribution of jobs and its evolution over time to observations of the
distribution of jobs and its evolution over time.
For instance, the workhorse model in the skill-biased technical change
literature (see Katz and Murphy (1992) or Acemoglu (2002)) assumes that
i) aggregate output is produced with a CES technology and ii) technical
change can only alter the efficiencies of skilled and unskilled labor over time,
i.e. σ, the elasticity of substitution parameter, is constant over time. The
assignment model developed in this paper can be used to evaluate how re-
alistic these assumptions are. Assumption i) implies that d1 = d2 = 1θ − 1,
and therefore that the distribution of jobs is symmetric around task 0.5, and
dj = nk. Assumption ii) implies that only the efficiency parameters χj may
change over time and hence that d1, d2, n1, n2 and θ are constant over time.
Assumption ii) implies that the distribution of tasks does not change over
time. This assumption seems to be at odds with recent evidence provided
by Autor et al. (2006) about the job polarization in the US economy. It
also contradicts recent empirical evidence by Gabaix and Landier (2008) and
Terviö (2008) that show that the rising wage inequality at the top of the
wage distribution (CEO pay) is merely explained by the density increase in
the upper tail of the distribution of firm size.15
In the light of the recent empirical evidence shown by Autor et al. (2006),
Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008), the workhorse model used in
the SBTC literature should be replaced by a model with i) a more general
production function of for instance the CRES type, and ii) technical change
that affect the distribution of capital (either firm size, tasks or machines)
over time and therefore allow the ease to substitute between skill types of
workers to vary over time.
15In Gabaix and Landier (2006) and Terviö (2007), manargers of different skills are
assigned to firms of different size. In their models, firm size plays the same role as machines
in the model developed in this paper.
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Figure 1: Job titles and the support of tasks. The support of tasks is derived from the assumption that i) ranking
job titles by decreasing productivity when performed with manual skills is equivelent to ranking tasks by increasing
productivity when performed with intellectual skills (comparative advantage of skills types) and ii) the ranking of
job titles is indepedent of the level of skills (complementarity of skills and tasks).
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Table 1: Cobb-Douglas productivity and the implied shape of the mapping and tasks density functions to obtain a
CRES production function.
Case Assumptions Implications
Production Mapping functions Density function
p1(t1, v) p2(t2, v) t1(v) t2(v) f(v)
A b1tm11 vn1 b2tm22 vn2 t1
³
b1
c1
´ 1
m1 1 v
γ1
m1 t2
³
b2
c2
´ 1
m2 (1− v)
γ2
m2 1B(n2+1,1)v
n2
B b1tm11 (1− v)n1 b2tm22 vn2 t1
³
b1
c1
´ 1
m1 1 v
γ1
m1 t2
³
b2
c2
´ 1
m2 (1− v)
γ2
m2 1B(n1+1,n1+1)v
n1(1− v)n1
C b1tm11 vn1 b2tm22 (1− v)n2 t1
³
b1
c1
´ 1
m1 1 v
γ1
m1 t2
³
b2
c2
´ 1
m2 (1− v)
γ2
m2 1
D b1tm11 (1− v)n1 b2tm22 (1− v)n2 t1
³
b1
c1
´ 1
m1 1 v
γ1
m1 t2
³
b2
c2
´ 1
m2 (1− v)
γ2
m2 1B(1,n1+1)(1− v)
n1
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